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Conceptions of Continuity: William Kingdon
Clifford’s Empirical Conception of
Continuity in Mathematics (1868–1879)
Josipa Gordana Petrunić
Science Studies Unit, University of Edinburgh
Résumé : Le concept de continuité est fondamental pour l’analyse mathéma-
tique contemporaine. Cependant, la définition actuellement employée, appa-
remment bien fondée de ce concept, n’est que l’une des nombreuses versions
historiquement énoncées, utilisées et affinées par les mathématiciens au travers
des siècles. Cet article présente la façon dont William Kingdon Clifford (1845-
1879) a façonné ce concept en lui donnant des bases physiques. La présentation
de l’effort de Richard Dedekind (1831-1916) pour établir mathématiquement
cette notion dans une perspective conventionnaliste permettra de mieux ap-
précier la spécificité de chacune des deux démarches. Cette étude montrera
quel rôle historique la continuité a joué dans plusieurs projets mathématiques
et philosophiques, et comment elle a été façonnée à partir des différents centres
d’intérêt de ses utilisateurs.
Abstract: The concept of continuity is fundamental to contemporary math-
ematical analysis. However, the seemingly well-founded definition currently
used for this concept is just one of many versions that have been historically
proffered, used and reshaped by mathematical practitioners over the centuries.
In looking at the particular manner in which William Kingdon Clifford (1845-
1879) defined and negotiated the physical underpinnings to “continuity” in his
works, and by comparing that account to Richard Dedekind’s (1831-1916) con-
ventionalist definition of the concept, it becomes clear that “continuity” has
served differing interests over the centuries and has been shaped by the process
of applying it to various philosophical and mathematical projects.
Introduction
In the edited collection Conceptions of Ether: Studies in the history of ether
theories [1981], G. N. Cantor and M. J. S Hodge write that, in presenting a
volume composed of various case studies in the history of ether concepts, their
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book introduces readers “to the broadest themes in the scientific thought of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries” [Cantor & Hodge 1981, ix].1 Like-
wise, histories of “continuity” can introduce historians to the broadest themes
in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century mathematics. “Continuity” is one of
the fundamental concepts in calculus, and its history is by no means simple
or straightforward. The aim of this paper is to show how one mathemati-
cian, namely William Kingdon Clifford (1845-1879), conceived of mathemati-
cal “continuity”, how he used it, and how he subtly redefined it as part of his
grander philosophical project—to prove that scientific theories based on action-
at-a-distance principles (i.e., instantaneous action across excessively large or
infinitesimally small expanses of space) constitute poor means of explaining
physical phenomena.
As a mid-19th century empiricist—influenced as much by the ideas of
Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer as he was by the ideas of Bernhard
Riemann, Sir William Rowan Hamilton and Hermann Grassmann—Clifford’s
approach to continuity can be summarized as follows: continuity is a con-
ventional mathematical tool based on empirical evidence. Its mathematical
definition is an abstraction of the assumed existence of continuity in space
and time. Continuous space implies that there are no gaps or moments of
non-existence in the fabric of the universe; continuous time implies that there
are no gaps in the fabric of forward-moving time. Specifically with regards to
the physical aspect of continuity, Clifford invoked the image of a continuous
medium that pervades the entire universe (i.e., an ether).
Thus, for Clifford, the techniques of calculus are conventional tools that
describe phenomena in space. The accuracy of the descriptions gained from
the use of such tools (for example, descriptions depicting the rate of accelera-
tion of an object falling towards Earth) is fundamentally dependent upon the
1. In their account of ether histories, Cantor and Hodge identify five categories of
“ether” concepts that have been discussed and used by natural philosophers, mathe-
maticians, and physicists over the course of the past century. The authors write: “We
might introduce the historical study of ether theories by stating simply what ether
is. But two reflections should make us pause before attempting this. First, although
essentialism is now favoured again in reputable quarters, the lessons of Wittgenstein
and others still stand. For many kinds of things it is futile to seek a common and
distinctive essence. For many terms it is misleading to demand a definition specifying
the conditions necessary and sufficient for their application. So it is with ether. We
cannot usefully indicate properties that all ethers must and only ethers can have.
Second, even if we could, we should not wish to make the attempt independently of
historical inquiry. For definition demarcation of one kind of theory from others may
serve merely to separate lines of theorising that in fact developed together, or to con-
flate those that developed apart” [Cantor & Hodge 1981, 1]. I could repeat Cantor’s
and Hodge’s reflections here as an introduction to my own account of “continuity” as
it appeared throughout the 19th century and earlier. “Continuity” was not a clearly
defined mathematical notion. It was not a perfectly understood physical notion. It
was used by various authors in various ways serving their varying interests. In short,
it is a concept with a history, and the historical construction of its meaning is still
ongoing.
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truth of the assumption that continuity exists in the ontological structure of
the universe. Following in the footsteps of a quintessentially British-empiricist
tradition, Clifford accepted that there is no way to know certainly whether the
universe really is continuous; he acknowledged that many physical phenomena
might in fact be the product of discontinuities in space, rendering analyti-
cal techniques useless and inappropriate. However, Clifford contended that
if scientists correctly adopted the assumption that continuity is true of the
structure of the universe (as Clifford himself believed it to be), then they must
avoid the notion of “force” as a causal explanation of phenomena. Forces,
by their very nature, are a-physical; they exist independently of the mate-
rial bodies they act upon. Newtonian gravity is a case in point—the belief
that two bodies simultaneously express an attraction towards one another im-
plies that the “force” of attraction operates across immense tracks of space
instantaneously and thereby causes bodily motion. Such action amounts to
a “discontinuity” in space, meaning that physical theories often devolve into
metaphysical speculation. Clifford argued that scientists and mathematicians
who accurately accept the implications of analytical techniques must accept
certain limitations to their scientific theorizing. They must accept that mate-
rial interactions alone can result in changes of motion. For example, continuity
implies that “energy” (then a newly emergent concept in physics) can only pass
from one piece of matter to another; it cannot be transferred through a void.
Clifford’s contentions with regards to continuity would not have been out
of place among many of his contemporaries in the 1870s, given that many of
his colleagues sympathized with the empiricist undertones in his foundational
arguments. However, a mathematical philosophy of the type that he was advo-
cating was not easily accepted by the whole of the mathematical community ei-
ther. Indeed, other mathematicians were interpreting “continuity” in radically
different ways at the same time that Clifford was pushing his empiricist agenda.
This is demonstrated in Richard Dedekind’s (1831-1916) account of continu-
ity. Dedekind and Clifford make useful comparative case studies because both
mathematicians clearly defined their guiding conceptions of “continuity” by the
mid-1860s and both mathematicians published their views on continuity pri-
marily in the 1870s. Both practitioners were also deeply interested in exploring
the degree to which mathematical “continuity” was necessarily reliant upon
physical structures for its ontological content. In addition, both Dedekind
and Clifford were influenced by Bernhard Riemann (1826-1866), who was a
colleague of Dedekind’s, and whose work in non-Euclidean geometry was of
fundamental importance to Clifford’s mathematical research. As a result, the
mathematicians wholeheartedly adopted many of Riemann’s conventionalist
musings on the foundations of mathematics.
Yet, for all of their similarities, Dedekind and Clifford also diverged sig-
nificantly in terms of their eventual definitions of “continuity”. For Dedekind,
mathematical “continuity” is made precise by appealing to infinitesimally small
intervals on a number line. Thus, “continuity” requires a formal definition in
mathematics that is independent of physical truths in the universe. Dedekind
48 Josipa Gordana Petrunić
defined “continuity” through the use of the mathematical concept known as an
“infinitesimal”. He argued the “infinitesimal” is not based upon spatial or geo-
metrical intuition. On Dedekind’s view, the infinitesimal measuring stick that
mathematicians embody in the notion of a “limit” can be rendered meaning-
ful through purely mathematical (i.e., arithmetical) construction. Conversely,
Clifford argued the “infinitesimal” is fundamentally and irrevocably empiri-
cal; it cannot be understood without appealing to descriptive properties of
material space.
In this paper, I will explore the formal mathematical definition of continu-
ity that Dedekind provided in his account of real numbers (initially written in
the 1850s, but not translated into English until the 1870s) and compare it to
Clifford’s own materialist account (published throughout the 1870s). The aim
is to highlight the sociological claim that mathematical and scientific concepts,
such as “continuity”, are best understood as bearing a family-like resemblance
to a plethora of differing notions. “Continuity” has been defined in a plurality
of ways by different practitioners throughout history, and it has been used to
serve their differing interests.
1. On Continuity and Limits
From a contemporary standpoint, any first year course in calculus introduces
students to the intuitive, yet formally elusive, concept of “continuity.” Consider
for example the introductory remarks made in one such textbook. Here the
student is told:
The study of two concepts essential for calculus [is] limits and
continuity. Although the ideas behind them appear simple, they
are in fact difficult to understand. (It is often the case in mathe-
matics that the simplest-seeming ideas are the hardest.) It is easy
to grasp the idea of a limit, and the idea of continuity. To say
that an infinite sequence of numbers x1, x2, x3, . . . , approaches a
number x as a limit simply means that the further we go in the
sequence, the closer we get to x, and we can get as close as we
want simply by going far enough out in the sequence. Continu-
ity is even easier—a function f is continuous on an interval [a, b]
if it is possible to sketch its graph over the interval without lift-
ing the pencil from the paper. . . Despite this intuitive simplicity,
however, both ideas have proved extremely difficult to formalize
in mathematical language. [Voorhees & Chun 2004, 79]
The student who follows such a lesson is usually then introduced to Zeno’s
paradox in which Achilles and the tortoise race; the tortoise is given a head
start and Achilles is never able to catch up because he must always travel half
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the distance between himself and the tortoise ad infinitum. This is presented
as the historical antecedent to the modern concept of “continuity”; the notion
of a “limit” is introduced as the accepted resolution to Zeno’s paradox:
The mathematical resolution of the paradox is to note that the
sequence of values x1, x2, x3, . . . converges to a limit x, and that
this is the point at which Achilles passes the tortoise. Even to-
day, however, philosophers (but not mathematicians) argue about
whether this paradox has actually been resolved. [Voorhees &
Chun 2004, 81]
A full account of the various contemporary accounts of continuity is be-
yond the remit of this paper. However, it is useful to note that within the
world of calculus education, the now accepted “precise” account of continuity
is as follows:
The limit of a function as x approaches a can often be found
simply by calculating the value of the function at a. Functions
with this property are called continuous at a. We will see that the
mathematical definition of continuity corresponds closely with the
meaning of the word continuity in everyday language. (A continu-
ous process is one that takes place gradually, without interruption
or abrupt change.)
Definition: A function f is continuous at a number a if
lim
x→a
f(x) = f(a)
Notice that Definition 1 requires three things if f is continuous at a:
1. f(a) is defined (that is, a is in the domain of f),
2. limx→a f(x) exists,
3. limx→a f(x) = f(a).
The definition says that f is continuous at a if f(x) approaches
f(a) as x approaches a. Thus, a continuous function f has the
property that a small change in x produces only a small change
in f(x). In fact, the change in f(x) can be kept as small as we
please by keeping the change in x sufficiently small.
If f is defined near a (in other words, f is defined on an open
interval containing a, except perhaps at a), we say that f is dis-
continuous at a, or f has a discontinuity at a, if f is not contin-
uous at a.
Physical phenomena are usually continuous. For instance, the
displacement or velocity of a vehicle varies continuously with time,
as does a person’s height. But discontinuities do occur in such
situations as electric currents.
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Geometrically, you can think of a function that is continuous at
every number in an interval as a function whose graph has no
break in it. The graph can be drawn without removing your pen
from the paper. [Stewart 2003, 102]
We see that the precise account of continuity (propositions 1, 2, and 3) relies,
ultimately, upon physical or geometrical intuitions of uninterrupted space and
time and the associated mental image of an infinitesimal interval. However, the
language used to define it invokes formal symbols, suggesting an independence
from physical concerns. Hence, the modern conception of “continuity” is, in
many ways, a mélange of previously distinct approaches.
It is in rendering problematic the now accepted usage of “continuity” that
historians and sociologists can begin to see heterogeneity in the historical def-
initions offered for this seemingly settled and homogenous concept. Indeed,
mathematicians have used the word “continuity” to refer to very different things
at different times. A quick scan of literature spanning the past 10 decades in-
dicates that rarely has there existed a consensus over the meaning of “continu-
ity” in mathematics, physics, or philosophy [Pitkin 1906]. Early 20th century
discussions of “continuity” include, for example, Philip E.B. Jourdain’s 1908
account of “irrational numbers” in which he argued that “irrational numbers”
are often taught to students by appealing to ambiguous and poorly defined
notions of spatial extension [Jourdain 1908], while in 1933 G. J. Whitrow ar-
gued that the problem with relying upon the formal definition of limits in
calculus is that the “continuum”, upon which it is based, is nothing but “an
ingenious theoretical substitution for the vague empirical notion of the contin-
uous” [Whitrow 1933, 157]. Jose A. Benardete later wrote that rational and
real numbers are arithmetical approximations to the “continuum”—they are
based on an intuitive, spatial sense of continuity as represented in geometrical
magnitude [Benardete 1968]. Conversely, Ian Meuller argued in the mid-20th
century that the “continuum” could, and should, be rendered intelligible in
terms of discrete units only—not geometrical magnitudes. Meuller believed
practitioners could develop new and independent notions of “continuity” with-
out having to appeal to any geometrical or physical phenomenon as referents
[Meuller 1969].
More recently, the question of “continuity” and its place in the history
of mathematics has constituted the unifying theme for a colloquium held
in France in 1990. That gathering resulted in the compendium entitled Le
Labyrinthe du Continu [1992]. The editors recount:
La question du continu est à tout égard privilégiée : par son an-
cienneté, puisque, on le sait, la philosophie et les mathématiques
venaient juste de naître en Grèce lorsqu’elle fut pour la première
fois formulée ; par sa permanence, puisqu’elle n’a pour ainsi dire
jamais cessé d’occuper le devant de la scène, suscitant des débats
profonds, passionnés, incertains ; par sa centralité dans le champ
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scientifique, puisqu’elle est aujourd’hui clairement un enjeu non
seulement pour la logique et les mathématiques, mais aussi pour la
physique et les sciences cognitives. [Salanksi & Sinaceur 1992, III]
In other words, continuity’s definition, use, and legitimate place within math-
ematical, physical and philosophical speculation are still open to considerable
debate. The aim thus far has been to highlight the fact that debates over
“continuity” have continued unabated despite a seemingly standardized view
of the formal notion in mathematics.
2. Continuity and Dedekind’s Approach
Dedekind was writing on “continuity” at a time when Clifford was finishing
his undergraduate studies at Cambridge.2 The two mathematicians were both
deeply influenced by the works of Bernhard Riemann. Dedekind had been Rie-
mann’s contemporary as a student at Göttingen in the 1850s; Clifford would
later become the translator and advocate of Riemann’s work in Great Britain
in the early 1870s. As a result of their common Riemannian background,
both Dedekind and Clifford shared many fundamental beliefs regarding the
nature of mathematical knowledge. Both, for example, thought that mathe-
matical knowledge was constructed and conventional at root. Yet, they each
defined “continuity” in notably different ways. It is worthwhile to briefly ex-
plore Dedekind’s approach to the concept in order to observe the sociological
claim that mathematicians draw on social resources (including philosophical
belief systems) to interpret and reconstruct mathematical notions idiosyncrat-
ically, recreating the concepts they engage with along the way.
Largely due to his explicit essay on the topic, “Continuity and Irrational
Numbers”, which was conceived in the 1850s but not published until the 1870s,
Dedekind usually comes to mind today when mathematicians think of the for-
malisation of continuity. Consider, for example, the opinion of Walter Pitkin,
who states:
The problem of continuity enters into mathematics, physics and
philosophy in one guise or another. It seems to have reached a sat-
isfactory solution only in the first-named field, where the theory of
continua of higher order, and the Dedekind theory of the nature
of irrationals, appear to have brought about that much-desired
freedom from paradoxes which the physicist and philosophical ge-
ometer cannot attain. [Pitkin 1906, 597]
2. In the Preface to his essay “Continuity and Irrational Number”, Dedekind wrote
that in 1858 he found himself “obliged to lecture upon the elements of the differential
calculus,” and he “felt more keenly than ever before the lack of a really scientific
foundation for arithmetic” [Dedekind 1963].
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Dedekind was among those who rejected the use of physical intuition and
empirical observation in the behaviour of curves as the foundation for a math-
ematical conception of continuity.
As a former student of Gauss’s at the University of Göttingen from 1850
to 1852, Dedekind completed his Habilitation at the same time as Bernhard
Riemann in 1854. Following Gauss’s death, he was mentored both by Rie-
mann and J.P.G. Lejeune-Dirichlet, and later began to teach at Göttingen.
By 1874, having moved to Zürich, Dedekind had become influenced by Can-
tor’s attempts to introduce the “freedom of definition” into mathematics, after
which he devoted most of his efforts to the development of set theory. The
question of continuity and its links to infinitesimal analysis (as advanced by
A.L. Cauchy in particular) was thus an early concern for Dedekind. Yet, from
his introductory remarks to the essay indicated above, it is also clear that
“continuity” remained a concern for him well into the 1870s.
In the preface to his work on irrational numbers, Dedekind wrote that
his interest in the concept of continuity peaked when he was hired to teach
calculus at the Polytechnic in Zürich in 1858. In appealing to “the notion
of the approach of a variable magnitude to a fixed limiting value,” Dedekind
said he had recourse to “geometric evidences” which were highly useful from a
didactic point of view. Yet, that “this form of introduction into the differential
calculus can make no claim to being scientific, no one will deny,” he argued
[Dedekind 1963, 1]. Dedekind lamented that,
Even the most rigorous expositions of the differential calculus do
not base their proofs upon continuity but, with more or less
consciousness of the fact, they either appeal to geometric
notions or those suggested by geometry, or depend upon theo-
rems which are never established in a purely arithmetic manner.
[Dedekind 1963, 2]
Dedekind’s sole objective, therefore, was to find a “purely arithmetical and
perfectly rigorous foundation for the principles of infinitesimal analysis” such
that “continuity” would finally get a non-physical definition. Dedekind’s belief
was that a truly “scientific basis” for differential calculus and infinitesimal
analysis is to be found not in the observation of geometric behaviour (of curves)
or in any ambiguous spatial intuitions, but in arithmetic, where “arithmetic”
is to be understood as the theory of discrete numbers.
For Dedekind, the “whole of arithmetic” is an extension of the simple act
of counting and “counting itself [is] nothing else than the successive creation
of the infinite series of positive integers in which each individual is defined by
the one immediately preceding” [Dedekind 1963, 4]. When combined with the
four basic arithmetic operations (addition, multiplication, subtraction, and
division), the chain of these numbers proves to be an “exceedingly useful in-
strument.” The series of positive counting numbers always allows for addition
and multiplication; it does not, however, allow for subtraction and division in
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all instances. It was this limitation that had propelled humans to “creatively”
construct negative numbers and fractions in order to produce a more “com-
plete” set of numbers (the set of rational numbers) which possesses two key
characteristics:
1) Any of the four operations can be performed on any two elements in the
system, except in the case of division by 0; and,
2) The system “forms a well-arranged domain of one dimension extending
to infinity on two opposite sides” [Dedekind 1963, 5].
Dedekind admitted that the latter characteristic seemed to have a geometric
underpinning. To avoid the “appearance” that “arithmetic was in need of ideas
foreign to it,” Dedekind chose to focus on the “purely arithmetic” properties of
the rational number system, which he claimed were dependent only upon the
notion of a “cut” (Schnitt) [Dedekind 1963, 5]. The “cut” in question referred
to the fact that for any rational number, a, the system of rational numbers
divides into two sets: A1, and A2. “Every number of the first class A1 is
less than every number of the second class A2,” he wrote [Dedekind 1963,
6]. An analogy could be made between a straight line with an arbitrarily
chosen origin (o) and the rational number series. In such a model, every
rational number is represented by one point on this line. On the straight line,
L, “there [would be] infinitely many points which correspond to no rational
number,” he noted [Dedekind 1963, 8]. Therefore, the straight line is infinitely
“richer in point-individuals than the domain R of rational numbers in number-
individuals” [Dedekind 1963, 9]. To account for all “phenomena in the straight
line” (that is, to account for all “cuts” on the line) the mathematician must
construct new numbers “such that the domain of numbers shall gain the same
completeness, or as we may say at once, the continuity, as the straight line”3
[Dedekind 1963, 9].
Dedekind further noted that irrational numbers are often introduced with
reference to the conception of “extensive magnitudes.” Such “magnitudes” have
not, however, been “carefully defined” and pedagogical appeals to extensive
magnitude mean that mathematicians have been explaining “number” as the
product of a process of measuring [Dedekind 1963, 9]. Dedekind’s objective
was to separate himself from that tradition in order to demonstrate that the
basis for mathematical continuity is arithmetical; thus, it is not reliant upon
measurement or upon the assumed existence of continuity in space, which
underlies any process of physical measurement.
Historically, the comparison of the domain R (rational numbers) with a
straight line has “led to the recognition of the existence of gaps, of a certain
incompleteness or discontinuity of the former, which we ascribe to the straight
line completeness, absence of gaps, or continuity,” Dedekind wrote [Dedekind
1963, 10]. Naturally, mathematicians have been left wondering what continuity
actually refers to. “Everything must depend on the answer to this question”
3. The emphases are Dedekind’s own.
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and “only through it shall we obtain a scientific basis for the investigation of
all continuous domains” [Dedekind 1963, 10]. For Dedekind, the answer is not
to be found in “vague remarks about the unbroken connection in the smallest
parts” [Dedekind 1963, 10]. Rather, a precise account of continuity requires a
definition of the following sort:
If all points of the straight line fall into two classes such that every
point of the first class lies to the left of every point of the second
class, then there exists one and only one [point] which produces
this division of all points into two classes, this severing of the
straight line into two portions. [Dedekind 1963, 11]
This tool can be understood to be a cut upon a line which is not represented by
a rational number. Whenever we have a cut (A1, A2), in which A1 is the lower
limit of the number and A2 is the upper limit (neither of which is produced by
a rational number) then mathematicians must create a new irrational number,
which should be regarded as completely defined by the cut (A1, A2). In effect,
every irrational number becomes an interval on a line in which the upper and
lower limits of the interval are the same.
To obtain a full definition of continuity, mathematicians also need to con-
sider the relationship between two cuts (A1, A2) and (B1, B2). If two cuts
produce two numbers α and γ, then the principle of continuity indicates that
there is an infinite number of different numbers β (that is, an infinite number
of cuts or intervals) lying between those two numbers. The upshot of this def-
inition is that in considering real number operations such as
√
2×
√
3 =
√
6,4
mathematicians must appeal to the idea of continuous functions and limiting
values. For Dedekind, arithmetic “continuity” is one based on limiting values
defined by infinitesimal intervals. In particular, if we have two numbers a and
β, which are characterized by the properties that if ǫ is an arbitrarily small,
positive magnitude then x < a+ǫ and x > β−ǫ, but never x < a−ǫ or x < β+ǫ.
If a and β are different from one another, “However small be the positive mag-
nitude ǫ, we always have finally x < a+ ǫ and x > β − ǫ [where] x approaches
the limiting value a” [Dedekind 1963, 27]. These examples demonstrate the
fundamental connection between the principle of continuity and infinitesimal
analysis, Dedekind claimed; they also indicate the manner in which continuity
can be arithmetically presented and thus severed from any geometrical roots.
Dedekind noted that although most of his readers would find this defi-
nition of continuity to be common sense, and although they might even be
4. In a celebratory account of Dedekind’s contribution to the field of number the-
ory, David Fowler writes that mathematicians often have a “naïve belief that arith-
metical operations on decimals pose no problems.” Fowler contends that Dedekind’s
definition of continuity allows us to recognize that stating 0.999. . .= 1.000 is prob-
lematical unless we first recognize and adopt a synthetic approach to the creation
of new types of numbers. Such an approach is necessary, in Fowler’s view, for the
resolution of the equation
√
2 ×
√
3 =
√
6, which presupposes that 0.999. . .= 1.000
is a legitimate identity to make [Fowler 1992, 725–733].
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disappointed to learn by such “commonplace remark[s] the secret of continu-
ity”, he could not prove the truth of his own claims:
I may say that I am glad if every one finds the above principle so
obvious and so in harmony with his own idea of a line; for I am
utterly unable to adduce any proof of its correctness, nor has any
one the power. [Dedekind 1963, 11]
In other words, the assumption of continuity is nothing other than the ax-
iom by which mathematicians attribute continuity to the line. The notion of
“continuity” is an axiomatic one. It is not empirical or contingent upon the
observation of motion in space. It is an assertion—it is an exercise in logic.
Because it is a created concept, Dedekind concluded:
If space has at all a real existence it is not necessary for it to
be continuous; many of its properties would remain the
same even were it discontinuous. And if we knew for certain
that space was discontinuous there would be nothing to prevent
us, in case we so desired, from filling up its gaps, in thought,
and thus making it continuous; this filling up would consist
in a creation of new point-individuals and would have
to be effected in accordance with the above principle”.
[Dedekind 1963, 12]
In a recent analysis of Dedekind’s account of continuity, Roger Cooke tells
us that Dedekind’s aim in linking the definition of continuity to infinitesi-
mal analysis was to address a “foundation problem that had lain beneath the
surface of analysis since the time of Descartes” [Cooke 2005, 553]. It was a
foundational problem that the ancients had dealt with under the rubric of
“incommensurables”—namely, the problem of how to express diagonals and
sides of squares that could not be represented as ratios or integers. The prob-
lem facing mathematicians right up until Descartes’ time, says Cooke, is that
“geometric magnitudes had never been systematized in terms of arithmetic
rules, since they had never been thought of as numbers” [Cooke 2005, 554].
As Cooke explains, Descartes was among the first to interpret the product of
two lengths as a line as opposed to an area. His analytic geometry was not,
however, without its problems. The mean-value theorem, for example, relied
on some notion of “continuity” to,
Guarantee that a curve containing points on both sides of a line
must intersect the line. But, as the Pythagoreans had shown, the
numerical version of this theorem was false: the point of inter-
section might very well not correspond to any number. It was
incorrect to call the intersection an irrational number, since there
was no articulated theory of irrational magnitudes that allowed
them to be added or multiplied like numbers. Algebraic rules such
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as
√
ab =
√
a ×
√
b applied to magnitudes by fiat, but were diffi-
cult to prove, even geometrically; and no one had produced any
corresponding arithmetic rules, or even a non-tautological defi-
nition of the square root of a non-integer. Any such definition
first of all begged the question of the existence of the object de-
fined; and if existence is granted by appeal to geometry, the rules
for treating lengths as numbers still needed to be formulated and
proved correct. Such was the situation that confronted Dedekind.
[Cooke 2005, 555]
Working within this tradition, Dedekind had become concerned over the
possibility that continuity was invoked whenever mathematicians were implic-
itly (or explicitly) referring to ambiguous geometric conceptions (i.e., in their
descriptions of the real number line as a geometric magnitude). In line with
Riemann and Gauss before him, Dedekind’s aim was to prove that new number
systems could be constructed, as he did not think they were dependent upon a
priori physical truths [Cooke 2005, 559]. On Dedekind’s view, mathematicians
construct their tools, including their accounts of continuity, in order to carry
on with their research. They adopt such constructed rules as axiomatically
true statements about the systems within which they work. In arguing for
such an account of mathematics, Dedekind was engaged in the process of sep-
arating mathematical constructs from both scientific theorizing and physical
existence. “Continuity”, he argued, is based on arithmetical rules which involve
the notion of a “cut”. It exists as a constructed mathematical tool rendered
axiomatically true by fiat, and used in mathematical puzzle-solving, though
not necessarily in scientific theorizing.
3. Clifford’s Continuity
Clifford’s critical view of continuity underpins the almost virulent empiricism
that pervades his entire mathematical project. For Clifford, “continuity” is
to be understood as the assumption that there are no physical, non-material
gaps in the fabric of space. It is empirically justifiable; it makes sense to
believe that space is a continuous fabric of some sort of material ether. It
makes sense to believe that space exists everywhere—that there are no gaps
of non-existence from this end of the room to the other. It also makes sense
to believe that there are no gaps in the continuity of time; there are likely no
moments of non-existence that follow moments of existence. In so far as we
trust our sensory organs, we are justified, therefore, in believing in the conti-
nuity of space and time. Hence, we are justified in basing our mathematical
description of physical phenomena upon the assumption that continuity exists
as a physical fact.
Clifford’s mathematical concerns with continuity cannot be distinguished
from his other conceptual commitments, in particular his view on the knowl-
edge of causes. Calculus, he argued, involves the art of describing the rate of
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change in motion of a point or an object. “Continuity”, upon which this de-
scription is based, is fundamentally based upon a justified belief in spatial and
temporal continuity in the universe. Note that, for Clifford, mathematics is
fundamentally empirical, as well as conventional—the former being due to the
fact that we can know nothing beyond the provisions of our sensory organs,
and the latter being due to the fact that all of our knowledge, no matter how
well justified, is ultimately limited by the finite perceptual capacities of our
sensory organs. All knowledge is therefore empirically derived and open to
future revision. Thus, in considering Clifford’s stand on “continuity” we need
to consider two inter-related aspects of his philosophy:
1. Empirical experience (observation) as the basis of all mathematical
knowledge;
2. “Continuity” as a hypothetical property of space.
Clifford’s acceptance of “continuity” as a spatial property highlights his gen-
eral philosophy of science, which advocated for an ardent materialism in which
cause-and-effect relationships could only be accounted for via a series of con-
tiguous particle motions in space. Throughout the 1870s, Clifford felt the need
to discuss and explain these beliefs in great detail. His popular lectures and his
Common Sense of the Exact Sciences (published posthumously in 1885) were
aimed at non-specialist audiences for whom the notion of continuity would have
been new, or at least unfamiliar, terrain. For instance, when he died, Clifford
was engaged in writing a textbook for his first year students at University Col-
lege London (UCL). In part this was because Clifford was working within a
society that favoured and lauded popularizations of science and mathematics.
Scientists and popular lecturers such as T.H. Huxley, John Tyndall, and even
P.G. Tait (who popularized links between science and religion) had made it
the duty of experts to explain their expertise in palatable and popular forms,
even when writing for expert audiences. Clifford was hypersensitive to this
fact given his employment at UCL, an institution that had been established
with the aim of extending the scope of higher education to include students
who had emerged from families not traditionally associated with Cambridge
or Oxford (i.e., sons of merchants in London, and sons of secular families).5
Clifford, however, also devoted a significant amount of space in his expert
mathematical papers to discussing the concept. He used those publications
to advance controversial claims regarding the foundations of “number” and
“quantity”. One such claim was that “number” ought to be understood as
motion—as a “step in space”—where a “step” could be understood as a simple
geometrical displacement. Thus, all number would be geometrical at root,
unless specified as “discrete” in nature. “Continuity” would therefore constitute
5. Lightman notes that efforts to popularize science peaked in the late Victo-
rian period, by which point journals and magazines were hiring non-specialists to
journalistically present mathematical and scientific discoveries in accessible formats
[Lightman 1997].
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a fundamental property of “number” understood as “continuous magnitude”.
The implication here is that a certain kind of physical space is necessary in
order for numbers and their related operations to exist. These specific claims
set Clifford apart from the conventionalist philosophy that defined the works
of people such as Dedekind, because they indicate Clifford’s deeply empirical
approach to mathematical knowledge. His was an approach that accepted
the conventional nature of mathematical concepts, but only in so far as those
conventions were the product of empirical observations and inferences about
the space within which motion is possible.
For Clifford, all we can ever know is that which is empirically inferred. It is
important, therefore, to qualify Clifford’s view of empirical inference. While it
is the case that empirical evidence is the best judge of what does and does not
exist in this world, direct empirical knowledge is limited. It is circumscribed
by the finite reach of our sensory capacities. Because of this, Clifford accepted
that our mathematical descriptions can only ever be conventional expressions
of what we believe to be true about the world. In order to advance math-
ematical and scientific knowledge, experimentalists and mathematicians had
to be willing to speculate upon, and use, concepts related to the nature of
the world as they knew it indirectly. An example of this approach is found in
Sir William Rowan Hamilton’s work on quaternions which, Clifford claimed,
demonstrated that complex numbers were not special, mystical, or imaginary
“quantities”.6 Rather, they could be meaningfully understood when thought of
as geometrical operators that caused bodies to rotate in space. Accepting such
an interpretation required that mathematicians revise their beliefs regarding
the universality of certain mathematical principles, in particular the princi-
ple of commutativity. It also required that mathematicians quench any desire
to ideologically preserve commutativity in light of the useful tools that could
emerge when adherence to such traditional principles were abandoned.
An early indication of what Clifford had in mind by advancing such a phi-
losophy of mathematics is found in his paper, “On the Space Theory of Matter”
(delivered to the Cambridge Philosophical Society in 1870 and published in its
proceedings in 1876)7 [Clifford 1876b]. Although it is unclear when Clifford
first read the German version of Riemann’s paper on the “Hypotheses that lie
at the base of geometry” (1854), it is likely that upon reading Riemann in the
mid-1860s (near the end of his university career), he began to further develop
his view of mathematical knowledge as an empirical craft. It is also at that
time that he likely began to develop his specific views regarding the physical
nature of mathematical “continuity”. In his 1870 presentation, Clifford posited
6. See [Pycior 1997] and [Pycior 1976] for discussions of the mysterious nature
accredited to imaginary numbers well into the 19th-century.
7. The Cambridge Philosophical Society was set up in 1819 to promote “scientific
inquiry” and facilitate “the communication of facts connected with the advancement
of Philosophy and Natural History”. We can consider this paper as one delivered to an
audience composed of experts, and students on their way to becoming mathematical
experts.
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that continuity was a workable hypothesis, which enjoined scientists and math-
ematicians to adhere to a fundamentally material view of the universe such
that the interaction between physical entities (say, of atoms at the most basic
level of material reality) would dominate descriptions of physical phenomena.
Clifford wrote that if scientists were to adopt the Riemannian hypothesis that
space might not be flat (i.e., that it might possess an inherent curvature)
then the continuity hypothesis would lead to the view that non-flat geomet-
rical structures could cause physical phenomena. In other words, continuous
geometrical displacements in non-flat space might manifest themselves in the
form of seemingly discontinuous phenomena perceived by humans in Euclidean
space (i.e., as gravity, electromagnetism, or colour change) [Clifford 1876b, 21].
Clifford’s justification for advancing such a hypothesis was in part phys-
iological. A scientist’s sensory perceptions are limited, he wrote. Consider
the fact that the axioms of plane geometry work on a piece of paper, while in
reality, we know the piece of paper is covered with “small ridges and furrows,
upon which (the total curvature not being zero) these axioms are not true”
[Clifford 1876b, 21]. The scientist’s limited experience of space may suggest
that the axioms of solid geometry are more or less true for finite portions of
space, but we “have no reason to conclude that they are true for very small
portions, and if any help can be got thereby for the explanation of physical
phenomena, we may have reason to conclude that they are not true for very
small portions of space” [Clifford 1876b, 21]. Clifford combined his views of
geometry with his overarching belief in the existence of spatial and temporal
continuity in order to make the following claims:
(1) That small portions of space are in fact of a nature analogous to little
hills on a surface which is on the average flat; namely, that the ordinary
laws of geometry are not valid in them;
(2) That this property of being curved, or distorted, is continually be-
ing passed on from one portion of space to another after the manner
of a wave;
(3) That this variation of the curvature of space is what really happens in
that phenomenon which we call the motion of matter, whether ponder-
able or etherial;
(4) That in the physical world nothing else takes place but this variation,
subject (possibly) to the law of continuity [Clifford 1876b, 21–22].
This paper stands as one of many in which Clifford built up a new philosophical
approach to mathematical and scientific theorizing. In Clifford’s worldview, if
mathematicians and theorists were to consistently abide by the physical prin-
ciple of “continuity”, explanations of seemingly discontinuous events (such as
gravitational attraction between bodies) could lead to new conceptualizations
of spatial structure (i.e., non-flat spaces).
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4. Clifford the Riemannian
Based on his view of continuity, Clifford developed operational tools which he
called bi-quaternions. In so doing, he aimed to expand upon both Hamiltonian
quaternions as well as Grassmannian algebra.8 Clifford’s bi-quaternions consti-
tuted another form of non-commutative algebra involving operators that could
be used to map the motion of rigid bodies in Euclidean and non-Euclidean
spaces. Throughout the 1870s, Clifford developed his bi-quaternions in the
hopes of linking the seemingly empirical reality of Euclidean space to a geomet-
ric model that would be able to describe rigid body motion in non-flat spaces.
Lauded in a posthumous review (by his biographer H. J. Stephen Smith),
Clifford’s contributions on bi-quaternions included: “Preliminary Sketch of
Bi-quaternions” [1873], “A Further Note on Bi-quaternions”9 [1876], and his
book-length account Elements of Dynamic: an introduction to the study of mo-
tion and rest in solid and fluid bodies [1878]. In those works, Clifford outlined
his development of various new mathematical operators called “rotors”, “mo-
tors” and “bi-quaternions”, which resulted from his continuing interest in the
description of physical motion in Riemannian manifold space. As Smith wrote,
Riemann’s ideas of a constant curvature in space lies at the bottom
of Clifford’s theory of bi-quaternions, to which he devoted much
continuous thought, and which was the origin of his researches
into the classification of geometric algebras.10 [Tucker 1882, xlv]
Indeed, Clifford’s work constituted a major break with traditional geomet-
rical thinking in that:
Some men who have an ardent love for new knowledge find it
difficult to maintain an unflagging interest in geometry, because
they regard it as a purely deductive science of which the first
principles (axioms, postulates, and definitions), whether derived
from experience or not, are unquestionable and contain implicitly
in themselves all possible propositions concerning space. Thus,
the unknown, or at least the unforeseen, seems to be excluded
from geometry, because whatever may be found out hereafter must
be latent in what is already known”. [Tucker 1882, xxxl]
Such staid attitudes had begun to change in Great Britain in the 1860s, and
they became more prominent throughout the 1870s, largely due to the popular-
8. Only some of the Hamiltonian aspects of Clifford’s work will be highlighted
here; I elaborate upon the Grassmannian aspects of his work in my PhD thesis (to
be submitted June 2009).
9. These two papers were left untitled by Clifford; their respective names are to
be credited to Robert Tucker.
10. According to Tucker, nine-tenths of the papers in his Mathematical Papers are
“geometrical” in nature.
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izing efforts by Hermann von Helmholtz and Clifford. Those two mathemati-
cians defended the usefulness and justifiability of non-Euclidean geometrical
models in mathematical physics. As Tucker recounted:
Upon the view put forward by Riemann and adopted by Clifford,
the essential properties of space have to be regarded as things
still unknown, which we may one day hope to find out by closer
observation and more patient reflection, and not as axioms to be
accepted on the authority of universal experience, or of the inner
consciousness. [Tucker 1882, xl]
Both Clifford and Helmholtz emphasized the conventional and hypothetical
nature of the Euclidean axioms and the consequent need for an empirically-
based revision of Euclidean-dominated mathematics and research programmes
found within the university settings of Cambridge, UCL, and other British edu-
cational institutions. Clifford’s concerns regarding “continuity” formed part of
this wider empiricist agenda, which included the introduction of non-Euclidean
geometries to mathematical physics and the reform of mathematics education
in general. Clifford argued that bi-quaternions were the result of observing
“continuity” in physical processes, which he felt required more powerful con-
ventional description than that provided by the Cartesian coordinate system.
Tucker recounts four assumptions Clifford made regarding the underly-
ing “ordinary conceptions about space”. Those “conceptions” included the
following:
- Spatial continuity;
- Spatial flatness at microscopic levels;
- Spatial similarity at every point;
- The possibility of the existence of figures similar to one another, but on
different scales of magnitude [Tucker 1882, xl].
As mentioned earlier with regards to “continuity”, Clifford was philosophi-
cally ready,
To adopt either of the two opposite hypotheses that space is con-
tinuous or that it is discontinuous, while admitting fully that no
phenomena have yet been observed which point to its discontinu-
ity. [Tucker 1882, xli]
In his research, Clifford found it productive to assume that continuity did exist,
while the other axiomatic claims in mathematics could be revised around it.
With regards to the second assumption, Clifford followed Riemann in ar-
guing that mathematicians and scientists had to be willing to reject the notion
that between every three points very near to one another there always exists
a triangle with an internal angle value of 180 degrees. The idea that objects
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may not stay the same shape as they move through space suggests that space
might not be homogeneous. Clifford thought the topological structure of space
might vary from one section of space to another. Thus, our perceptions of an
object in one section of space compared to our perceptions of that same object
in another section of space might yield very different empirical results. These
views underpinned Clifford’s belief that action-at-a-distance “forces” (such as
Newtonian gravity) were describable in terms of simple movements (or dis-
placements) of bodies in non-flat or elliptic space. Indeed, for Clifford, any
empirical perceptions of inexplicable, mysterious, or mystical “forces” were an
indication of a non-Euclidean ontological curvature requiring a new form of
geometrical description.
One of the seminal influences that helped to shape Clifford’s views on these
matters can be found in Riemann’s paper, “On the Hypotheses which Lie at
the Bases of Geometry” (originally delivered in 1854). In that paper, Riemann
argued that “geometry assumes, as things given, both the notion of space and
the first principles of constructions in space” [Riemann 1867, 55]. According
to Riemann, geometry contains definitions of these assumptions; yet, those
definitions remain merely “nominal”:
The true definitions appear in the forms of axioms. The relation of
these assumptions remains consequently in darkness. We neither
perceive whether and how far their connection is necessary, nor,
a priori, whether it is possible. [Riemann 1867, 55]
Riemann set as his own task that of clarifying those nominal relationships
by reconsidering the idea of magnitudes, in particular “extended magnitudes,
including space” [Riemann 1867, 55]. He aimed to construct “the notion of a
multiply extended magnitude out of general notions of magnitude”, the up-
shot of which is the fact that multiply extended magnitudes require differing
measure-relations [Riemann 1867, 55]. Different spatial structures require dif-
ferent metric systems.
One consequence of Riemann’s reconsideration of measure relations in var-
iously extended magnitudes is that “the propositions of geometry cannot be
derived from general notions of magnitude, but (. . . ) the properties which dis-
tinguish space from other conceivable triply extended magnitudes are only to
be deduced from experience” [Riemann 1867, 56]. Triply extended magnitudes
(space of three dimensions) that can be measured using Euclidean lines and
line segments on a Cartesian graph, constitute only one particular case [Rie-
mann 1867, 56]. That is to say the system Euclid had established constitutes
only one system of measure-relations in space. Many other systems could, in
theory, be created.
In Riemann’s opinion, the Euclidean construction should therefore be con-
sidered to be an hypothesis: “These matters of fact are, like all matters of fact,
not necessary, but only of empirical certainty; they are hypotheses” [Riemann
1867, 56]. Scientists could investigate the “probability” that humans live within
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a spatial fabric that abides by Euclidean measure relations, but the establish-
ment of such probabilities would be dependent upon the powers of empirical
observation open to us. Therefore, it remains incumbent upon mathemati-
cians to always question the validity or “justice” of “their extension beyond the
limits of observation” [Riemann 1867, 56]. Riemann, therefore, suggested that
mathematicians extend their systems to include models that could describe
and grasp that which is not directly observable.
In clarifying his notion of an n-ply extended magnitude, or “manifold”,
Riemann considered two types of manifolds: continuous and discrete. This
distinction is one that Clifford would later reproduce in his own mathematical
papers and in the Common Sense of the Exact Sciences. Examples of discrete
manifolds, Riemann wrote, are common in everyday language. Any group
of distinct things, such as the letters in the alphabet, can be considered to
be a discrete manifold. Continuous manifolds, on the other hand, are more
difficult to imagine. One common example is the position of perceived objects,
when definite portions of manifoldness are distinguished by boundaries, which
themselves take up no space11 [Riemann 1867, 57].
In addition, the difference between discrete and continuous “quantity” can
be made clear by discussing discrete number in terms of “counting” and con-
tinuous magnitude in terms of “measuring”. Riemann wrote that “measure
consists in the superposition of the magnitudes to be compared. It therefore
requires a means of using one magnitude as the standard for another” [Riemann
1867, 57]. In the absence of a “standard”, two magnitudes can only be com-
pared “when one is a part of the other, in which case we can only determine the
more or less and not the how much” [Riemann 1867, 57]. The question of “How
much?” is, therefore, only applicable in a continuous manifold when discussing
“How many units of measure?” and not “How much of the thing itself?” since
a continuous system is not open to discrete divisions12 [Riemann 1867, 57].
“Continuity” serves as the basis of continuous manifolds, as it implies a cer-
tain kind of spatial structure-one in which a point or object can move about in
a variety of directions without interruption. The number of directions of move-
ment determines the type of space being defined. “If one regards the variable
object instead of the determinable notion of it,” Riemann wrote, the construc-
tion may be described as a “composition of a variability of n dimensions and
a variability of one dimension” [Riemann 1867, 58]. Riemann argued that in
any given manifoldness (any n-ply extended space) there are n determinations
11. Riemann called these portions “quanta”.
12. Riemann noted that it was this distinction that formed “a general division of the
science of magnitude in which magnitudes are regarded not as existing independently
of position, and not as expressible in terms of a unit, but as regions in a manifoldness”.
By the time Riemann’s paper was published in 1854, such research had become a
necessity. The previous lack of such considerations was “no doubt a chief cause why
the celebrated theorem of Abel, and the achievements of Lagrange, Pfaff, Jacobi
for the general theory of differential equations, have so long remained unfruitful”
[Riemann 1867, 57].
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of quantity which, together, define the position of the object (for example, in
Cartesian space, x−, y−, and z−coordinates provide three “quantities” that
together give us the precise location of an object). In any manifold space, “The
determination of position in it may be reduced to n determinations of magni-
tude” [Riemann 1867, 59]. Measure-relations can be studied in the abstract,
because their dependence upon one another can be represented by formulae.
However, geometric representations always lay at the bases of these formulae.
In sum, Riemann’s working hypothesis was that position-fixing can be re-
duced to quantity-fixing in an n-dimensioned manifoldness. If the position of
an object changes, its displacement can be represented by a relative change
in quantities (measure-relations) in a given number of directional dimensions.
In cases in which the manifold contains no curvature, the equivalent mathe-
matical model at play is a Euclidean one. However, Riemann contended that
such a model should be considered to be the exception and not the norm,
because in such spaces figures could be moved about with no change in their
size or shape.13
In the final section of his 1854 paper, Riemann elaborated upon the physi-
cal implications of his research by arguing that what remained to be done was
to determine “the degree to which these assumptions are borne out by expe-
rience” [Riemann 1867, 67]. Indeed, “It is upon the exactness with which we
follow phenomena into the infinitely small that our knowledge of their causal
relations essentially depends,” he wrote, adding that it is possible, and even
likely, that conventional Euclidean measurements based upon “the notion of
a solid body and of a ray of light, cease to be valid for the infinitely small.”
Instead, the only believable assumption that might remain is one of spatial
continuity—all else needs to flow from this conception of the universe, thus
leading to the rejection of action-at-a-distance principles, and other “discon-
tinuities” prominent in scientific theorizing [Riemann 1867, 68]. The entire
structure of good science, therefore, depends upon recognition of this fact.
Riemann concluded:
Researches starting from general notions, like the investigation we
have just made, can only be useful in preventing this work from
being hampered by too narrow views, and progress in knowledge
of the interdependence of things from being checked by traditional
prejudices. [Riemann 1867, 69]
Thus, the mathematician must be willing to engage in another domain of
knowledge, “another science” altogether, in order to determine and devise good
mathematics—namely, physics.
13. This claim was fundamental for both Helmholtz and Clifford’s respective
philosophies of science, in which they each sought to defend the view that non-
Euclidean geometry is physiologically justifiable because, even in uniformly curved
space, we do not perceive any change in shape of a body as it moves (even though
the underlying spatial structure might be non-flat).
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In a recent account of Riemann’s seminal paper, Jeremy Gray argues that
Riemann’s lecture (published posthumously in German in 1867) was to prove
“central to the overthrow of Euclidean geometry as the source of geometri-
cal ideas” [Gray 2005, 506]. The idea of a multiply extended magnitude was,
roughly, something that could be measured by a given number of coordinates.
Riemann concluded that geometry could be thought of as dealing with various
spaces (n-fold extended magnitudes) in which distances were to be measured
using an infinitesimal ruler [Gray 2005, 510]. If the infinitesimal measuring
rod could be placed anywhere and still offer the same scale of measurement,
it would mean that the space being measured is constant in curvature. Thus,
the sum of the angles in any one triangle in such a spatial model would be
equivalent to the sum of triangles at all places. However, Riemann ultimately
wanted to discuss the measurement of distances between points without having
to rely on Euclidean space.14 In addition, at the time of Riemann’s Habili-
tation, Gray writes, he was working in Wilhelm Weber’s physical laboratory.
Riemann had therefore been occupied with issues of gravitation, electricity,
and magnetism—all of which had the property of acting across vast distances
at “enormous speeds” [Gray 2005, 513]. Gray thus accounts for Riemann’s
approach to mathematics in the following way:
[Riemann] apparently sought to explain this by imagining that the
fabric of space was in some way subtly altered, and distortions in
it spread like ripples. He was not able to work this up into a
coherent theory, but it seems clear that this idea of conceptually
rethinking the nature of space in a direct physical context accounts
for many features of his lecture. It underlines the avowedly em-
pirical nature of the lecture, it is in line with Riemann’s attempt
to make proposals that allow one to explain phenomena, and it
explains the somewhat anti-Newtonian rhetoric. [Gray 2005, 513]
Clifford adopted all of these Riemannian themes. He assumed that space
is not discontinuous. Rather, he argued, the principle of “continuity” pre-
vails and mathematical-physical representations of dynamics had to adapt to
that fact. Spatial “continuity” allowed for the transmission of action between
cause and effect. Clifford’s repeated attacks on gravity—a force that he un-
derlined as problematical—drew heavily from Riemann’s own attacks on such
action-at-a-distance concepts. Clifford’s idiosyncratic approach to these top-
ics, however, comes from his engagement with both Hamiltonian quaternion
analysis and Grassmannian algebra, both of which aided in his development
of bi-quaternions. Clifford’s bi-quaternions kinematically describe the motion
of rotating rigid bodies. They offer the possibility of describing physical phe-
nomena in continuous, non-flat space—this being an extension, in Clifford’s
opinion, of Riemann’s own work.
14. Gray writes that Riemann’s “inspiration here was Gauss’s discovery of curva-
ture, which Gauss showed was something that could be determined from quantities
measured in the surface alone” [Gray 2005, 509].
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5. A Further Note on Bi-Quaternions
Clifford built upon Riemann’s distinction between discrete and continuous
manifolds in his “Further Note on Bi-quaternions” by highlighting the differ-
ence between discrete numbers and continuous “steps in space”. The notion
of a “step in space” constituted a unifying theme throughout Clifford’s works,
in which he described arithmetic, algebra, and calculus in terms of simple
“steps in space”. For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on Clifford’s brief
discussion of the theme in the “Further Note on Bi-quaternions”. This paper
demonstrates Clifford’s view that mathematical concepts do reflect the “con-
tinuity” of physical space and, thus, they can be described as “steps in space”.
Recall that, for Clifford, “continuity” is ultimately an assumption. Mathe-
matical knowledge remains a conventional language open to indefinite revision
limited only by that which is empirically possible. Consider the following
equation:
2× 3 = 6
Following in the tradition of the Newtonian polar coordinates, which posited
that a set of polar coordinates (r, θ) does not define a point uniquely, Clifford
suggested that an arithmetic operation is alone open to multiple representa-
tions. In the equation above, two interpretations exist. In the first instance,
“3” can be considered a “concrete number of things” in which “2” is the op-
eration of doubling such that we would read the entire equation as “doubling
three marbles makes six marbles” [Clifford 1876b, 385]. In the second instance,
both “2” and “3” can be abstract numbers which affirm the existence of a third
number “6”. That third number has a definite relation to the other two num-
bers only as their product (i.e., as the result of an operation, rather than as
a quantity on its own) [Clifford 1876a, 385]. Clifford contended that “various
meanings” could be given to the numbers “2” and “3”:
We have regarded 2 as a symbol of operation, 3 as a concrete
number, and 6 as a concrete number. But we may also regard
all three symbols as symbols of operation, and so read the for-
mula ‘doubling the triple of anything makes the sextuple of it’.
[Clifford 1876a, 385]
Similarly, the equation abc = d possesses two interpretations, Clifford wrote:
1) a times b times c things makes d things;
2) a times b times c times anything makes d times that thing [Clifford
1876a, 386].
The last symbol can be regarded either as a concrete number or as a symbol of
operation. Such varying interpretations allow one to easily extend the concepts
of addition, subtraction, and other arithmetical processes to “steps”, Clifford
contended. For example, he provided a double meaning to the symbols “+”
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and “−”. In the first instance, the symbols would indicate the direction of a
“step”. The symbol (+3) would therefore indicate a step of 3 units forward,
while the symbol (-3) would indicate a step of three units backwards. “When
these symbols are attached to an operation performed upon steps, they mean
retaining and reversing respectively,” Clifford explained [Clifford 1876a, 386].
Thus, the equation (-2)(+3) = (-6) would be open to two interpretations:
1) Doubling a step of three forward and reversing it makes a step of 6
backward;
2) [Or] To triple a step and retain its direction then to double and reverse
it is the same as to sextuple and reverse it [Clifford 1876a, 387].
Given the controversy surrounding “quaternions” as initially proposed by
Sir William Rowan Hamilton in the first half of the 19th century (Pycior 1976),
and given that the debate regarding the foundations of mathematical “number”
(in particular, negative numbers and the square roots of negative numbers)
had not entirely died down by the time Clifford chose to develop and ex-
tend Hamiltonian quaternions and Grassmannian algebra, it is clear that this
seemingly basic introduction to the interpretability of mathematical concepts
in the “Further Note” in fact constituted an important philosophical state-
ment on Clifford’s part. Clifford’s aim was to demonstrate that since simple
mathematical concepts such as addition and subtraction could be treated in
an equivocal and malleable way, so too could more complex concepts such as
Hamiltonian vectors. The “rules” of arithmetic were by no means an ideological
barrier to the establishment of new mathematical system, especially if the sys-
tem in question upheld the principle of geometrical and physical continuity (as
we will see). In Clifford’s opinion—and against many of Hamilton’s critics—
quaternion algebra did not necessitate any philosophical conundrums or lead
to any troubling debates over the a priori status of mathematical knowledge.
It was as simple a step in logic for an empiricist such as Clifford to afford a
dual interpretation to the new system of non-commutative algebra.
In order to see how Clifford further extended Hamiltonian quaternions
on the basis of “continuity” as a physical fact, it is useful to provide a brief
account of what it is that Hamilton was actually claiming. It was during his
time as a student at Trinity College, Dublin, from 1823 to 1827, that Hamilton
had been exposed to the French works of P.S. Laplace, J.L. Lagrange, S.D.
Poisson and S.F. Lacroix [Lewis 2005, 460]. Some of those influences led him
to consider a problem that many mathematicians in the 1830s had considered
to be one of the most important of the day: how to extend the system of
number pairs (which represented complex numbers), to triples of numbers
such that the same operational properties were preserved [Lewis 2005, 461].
In his account of Hamilton’s efforts to do so, Lewis summarizes the problem
in the following way:
A complex number z = a + bi can be represented in the Eu-
clidean plane by the directed line segment from the origin to the
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point with real number coordinates (a, b). On multiplying z by
i(=
√
−1), the result would be the segment from the origin to
(−b, a) which can be regarded as the result of rotating the origi-
nal segment 90◦ counter-clockwise about the origin. The problem
could thus be put in a geometrical and somewhat more general
fashion: How can this mathematical operation, represented by ro-
tation about a point in the plane, be extended to rotation about a
line in three dimensions? Expressed this way the answer turns out
to be that four numbers, not three, are required. [Lewis 2005, 461]
Hamilton’s construction was to introduce the now well-known imaginary
entities, i, j, k, which abided by the following rules:
i2 = j2 = k2 = −1
ij = k
jk = i
and,
ijk = −1
The resulting “hypercomplex number”—or Hamilton’s quaternion (q)—was
formed as:
a+ bi + cj + dk,
where a, b, and c are the real number components of the expression. Hamilton
made the following claims in regards to the expressions β÷α = q and q×α = β:
The quotient q can be regarded as an operator that produces one
directed line segment from another. If q is a ‘tensor’, or signless
number, then it affects only the length of α. If q is a sign (+ or
−) it changes the direction of α. If it is a real number then q may
have the effect of changing both the direction and length. If it is a
‘vector-unit’ (or ‘quadrantal vector’), i, j, k, then the effect is to
turn α right-handedly through 90 degrees in a plane perpendicular
to the vector-unit. Hamilton points out that a multiplication of a
vector-unit, say i, by itself results in a rotation of 180◦, i.e., the
same as multiplying by −1 (reversing its direction) or i2 = −1.
[Lewis 2005, 464]
Hamilton had called the addition of a scalar quantity and a vector a “quater-
nion”. It was an entity that contained both a scalar part and a vector part
and caused rotation about an axis with a magnitude change in a given vector.
Clifford repeated much of Hamilton’s approach in introducing his own bi-
quaternions to readers in the 1870s. If mathematicians assumed that the law of
addition of vectors held in a plane, such that AB+BC = AC, then they could
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Figure 1: [Clifford 1882, 414]
interpret the “so-called imaginary or impossible quantities [as] the operators
which convert one vector into another,” Clifford wrote [Clifford 1876a, 386]
(See Figure 1).
On this interpretation, i operates on a vector causing it to turn counter-
clockwise through a right angle so that:
i×OE = OA.
If a = OM/OA and b = MB/OA, where a and b are ratios of vectors in a
line (as defined above), then Clifford argued that every expression of the form
a+ bi is a ratio of two vectors [Clifford 1876a, 387]. By giving “proper values”
to a and b every vector in the plane can be represented by (a×OA)+(b×OB′)
[Clifford 1876a, 387] such that:
OA = j;
OA′ = k;
then
ij = k;
ik = −j.
Turning to the problem of vectors in space, Clifford noted that “the operation
which makes one vector into another is of the form a + bq”, where Q turns
through a right angle in the plane of the two vectors.
Note that Clifford’s idiosyncratic approach to this notion was to search
for a mechanism by which vectors were not limited to turning through right
angles in their plane of existence. Rather, he wanted to develop a mechanism
by which one could transform a vector in a given plane into a vector in an
alternative plane. To do so, he had to extend the notion of vectors as directed
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lines (or steps) in space to directed, positioned, and rotating lines (or steps)
in space. The emphasis on position in Clifford’s bi-quaternions is largely a
product of his engagement with Riemannian geometry, as explained earlier.
Riemann had emphasized the crucial aspect of position in space, given that
the same body in two different locations of space might behave differently
depending on the geometrical curvature of that particular segment of space
(thus, what we perceive of as being discontinuous “forces” acting on bodies
is explicable by reference to continuous motion in non-flat spaces). Thus, in
Clifford’s extension of Hamiltonian quaternions, the principle of continuity re-
mains intact—bi-quaternions operate on entities that are composed of both
rotors and vectors (namely, “motors”) in continuous physical space. If space
were discontinuous, the mathematical use of these operators to describe phys-
ical phenomena would not be possible, because of spatial discontinuity, would
render biquaternion operations meaningless.
Thus, Clifford clarified the construction of a bi-quaternion in the following
way. First, “the velocity of a rigid body may be represented in one way only
as a rotation-velocity (ω) about a certain axis combined with a translation-
velocity (v) along that axis” [Clifford 1873, 182]. This combined velocity is
what he called a twist-velocity about a particular screw, where the axis of the
screw was the axis of rotation, and its pitch was the ratio v/ω (the ratio of
the translation to the rotation). Clifford then suggested the following terms:
1. A “screw” is the geometrical form resulting from the combination of an
axis, or straight line, with a pitch, which is a linear magnitude;
2. A “wrench” is the association of a screw with a magnitude “whose di-
mensions are those of a force”;
3. Finally, a “twist-velocity” is the association of a magnitude whose di-
mensions are those of an angular velocity [Clifford 1873, 183].
Along with these new basic spatial-geometrical entities, Clifford defined
his more complex creations such as “motors” in the following way:
Just as a vector (translation-velocity, or couple) is magnitude as-
sociated with direction, and as a rotor (rotation-velocity, or force)
is magnitude associated with an axis, so this new quantity, which
is the sum of two or more rotors (twist-velocity or wrench) is
magnitude associated with a screw. [Clifford 1873, 183]
The simplest example of a “motor” involved the general motion
of a rigid body.
With these new tools in hand, and assuming continuity to hold as a spatial
fact, Clifford explained the operation of quaternions and bi-quaternions as
follows. If we have the vectors AB and AC, both of which start from any
arbitrary point A, we can make AB identical to AC by “turning it round an
axis through A perpendicular to the plane BAC until its direction coincides
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with that of AC, and then magnifying or diminishing it until it is of the same
length as AC” [Clifford 1873, 183] (see Figure 2).
The ratio of the two vectors is the combination of an ordinary numerical
ratio (magnitude change) with a rotation (direction change). In Hamilton’s
terms, this means that a quaternion is the product of a tensor and a ver-
sor. Since point A is perfectly arbitrary, “this rotation is not about a def-
inite axis, but is completely specified when its angular magnitude and the
direction of its axis are given” [Clifford 1873, 184]. The mathematician can
therefore write that:
AC/AB = q [ quaternion].
For Clifford, this is an operation which,
Being performed on AB, converts it into AC, so that q ·AB = AC.
The axis of the quaternion is perpendicular to the plane BAC; and
it is clear that the quaternion operating upon any other vector AD
in this plane will convert it into a fourth vector AE in the same
plane, the angle DAE being equal to BAC and the lengths of the
four lines proportionals. [Clifford 1873, 184]
The problem, as mentioned earlier, was that a quaternion could only oper-
ate upon a vector that was perpendicular to its axis: “If AF be any vector not
in the plane BAC, the expression q · AF is absolutely unmeaning,” Clifford
wrote [Clifford 1873, 184]. He, therefore, set as his task the construction of an
operator by which one could convert a rotor into another rotor. In so doing
he found that he had to (see Figure 3):
Turn A about the axis AC into the position AB′, parallel to CD.
Then slide it along this axis into the position CD′. Lastly, mag-
nify or diminish it in the ratio of CD′ to CD. The first two
operations may be regarded as together forming a twist about
a screw whose axis is AC and whose pitch is AC
circ.meas. of ABB′
.
[Clifford 1873, 184]
Clifford explained that the ratio of two rotors constitutes the combination
of an ordinary numerical ratio with a twist, where a twist indicates a defi-
nite “screw” and is “only specified when its angular magnitude and the screw
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(involving direction, position, and pitch) [are] given” [Clifford 1873, 185]. He
then made the following analogy: “Just as the rotation (versor) involved in a
quaternion is the ratio of two directions, so the twist involved in the ratio of
two rotors is really the ratio of their axes”. Thus, by
Using the expression tensor-twist to mean the ratio of two rotors
(which is in fact a twist multiplied by a tensor), we may say that
a tensor-twist can operate upon any rotor which meets its axis at
right angles. [Clifford 1873, 185]
Like the quaternion, Clifford’s ratio of two rotors also had a “restricted
range of operation” [Clifford 1873, 185]. The question Clifford needed to an-
swer was: “What is the operation that converts one motor [which performs a
screw operation] into another?” [Clifford 1873, 185]. When two motors have
the same pitch, he said, the answer is easy: their ratio is a tensor-twist. The
tensor is the ratio of their magnitudes, and the twist is the ratio of their axes.15
The more general case, however, in which the pitches of two motors are differ-
ent, is not so simple to solve. If a motor consists of a rotor part and a vector
part, then its pitch is determined by the ratio of these two parts. Clifford
determined this ratio by combining a “suitable vector with a motor” such that
the pitch could be made to be “anything we like, without altering the rotor
part” [Clifford 1873, 186].
15. We are led to this conclusion, he wrote, “by considering each motor as the sum
of two rotors which do not intersect” [Clifford 1873, 186].
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Geometrical
Form
Quantity Example Ratio
Sense on a
straight line
Vector on a
straight line
Addition or Sub-
traction
Signed Ratio
(+, or −)
Direction in
Plane
Vector in Plane Complex quan-
tity
Complex ratio
[where
√
−1 is
an operator that
turns vectors]
Direction in
Space
Vector in Space Translation,
Couple
Quaternion
Axis Rotor Rotation-
Velocity, Force
Twist
Screw Motor Twist-Velocity,
System of Forces
Biquaternion
Therefore, to determine the operation that could convert motor A into
motor B, Clifford first let B′ be a motor that had the same rotor part as B
and the same pitch as A. To convert motor A into vector β (where β is a vector
parallel to the axis of B), he introduced the symbol (ω) “whose nature and
operation will at first sight appear completely arbitrary, but will be justified in
the sequel.” Analogously to quaternions, “the symbol ω, applied to any motor,
changes it into a vector parallel to its axis and proportional to the rotor part
of it” [Clifford 1873, 186]. This operation (ω) changes a rotation about an
axis into a translation parallel to that axis. The ratio of two motors can then
be expressed as the sum of two parts—one of which is a tensor-twist and the
other of which is ω multiplied by a quaternion [Clifford 1873, 188]. This ratio
is Clifford’s biquaternion.
Clifford concludes by offering the following table of concepts to his readers
to clarify the relationships that he has created between his various new enti-
ties in the extension of quaternion mathematics—entities that operate upon
physical bodies in continuous space.
6. Specialist and Non-Specialist Statements
It is possible now to paint the picture of a mathematician who could have cho-
sen to pursue research based on discontinuous spatial models (such as action-
at-a-distance theories), but who chose, not to do so. Rather, Clifford pursued
research based on models of elliptic and non-flat spaces, founding his pursuits
on the assumption that continuity existed as a structural aspect of space. His
aim was to develop tools that would help to describe rigid body motion by
extending what he thought was a useful starting concept (namely, Hamilto-
nian quaternions). The importance of “continuity” as the underlying basis for
Clifford’s advanced mathematical constructions is highlighted clearly in two
of Clifford’s early lectures on related topics—the first being “On the theories
of the physical forces” (delivered in 1870 to the Royal Institution), and the
second being “Atoms” (delivered in 1872 to a popular audience at the Sunday
Lecture Society).
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“On the theories of the physical forces” describes what Clifford deemed to
be the three historical stages of scientific belief, as well as his corollary be-
lief in the need to encourage a new “fourth” stage of scientific thought. The
first stage, Clifford argued, had involved the basic observation of phenomena
such as planetary motions; the second stage had involved theological reason-
ing as to the causes of those phenomena. In the third stage—the “era of
modern science”—partially materialist conceptions of cause (such as “force”)
had come into play. However, those conceptions often relied upon metaphys-
ical assumptions. In the new fourth stage of science—the stage that Clifford
felt himself to be engaged in as a reformist Victorian mathematician—the
conception of “force” would disappear altogether. Clifford’s aim in developing
bi-quaternions was to encourage a movement towards that “fourth” stage, by
designing mathematical tools that would precipitate the transition away from
action-at-a-distance principles (and their inherent discontinuities) and towards
new theories of continuous, non-flat spatial ontology and geometry.
In order to achieve these goals scientists had to confront the underlying
question: “What is it that lies at the bottom of thing?” In Clifford’s view, this
question is composed of two distinct queries:
1) Why do things happen?
2) What is it precisely that does happen? [Clifford 1870, 110].
The first question, he stated, is external to the province of science, Clifford
argued. It is a question whose answer lay outside the domain of human knowl-
edge.16 For the scientific inquirer, there is no hope of answering the question
“Why?”, unless an appeal to speculative metaphysics comes into play. The sec-
ond question is one that Science can aim to answer. But in order for science to
supersede the enquiry into why things happen, and to advance into the domain
of what is happening, Clifford argued that scientists must rely upon the “hy-
pothesis of continuity”. This is because the “hypothesis of continuity involves
such an interdependence of the facts of the universe as forbids us to speak of
one fact or set of facts as the cause of another set of facts” [Clifford 1870, 111].
In his popular account of continuity, Clifford wrote:
16. For an account of Clifford’s refusal to consider the “Why?” in scientific theoriz-
ing, consider the following polemical statement: “Reflect on the fact that for a single
particle, quite irrespective of everything else—the history of eternity is contained in
every second of time, and then try if you can find room in this one stifling eternal fact
for any secondary causes and the question why? (. . . ) Why does the moon go around
the Earth? When the solar system was nebulous, anybody who knew all about some
one particle of nebulous vapour might have predicted that it would at this moment
form part of the moon’s mass, and be rotating about the earth exactly as it does. But
why with an acceleration inversely as the square of the distance? There is no why
(. . . ) The cause is only the fact that at some moment the thing is so—or rather, the
facts of one time are not the cause of the facts of another, but the facts of all time are
included in one statement, and rigorously bound up together” [Clifford 1870, 123].
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Things frequently move. Some things move faster than others.
Even the same thing moves faster at one time than it does at an-
other time. When you say that you are walking four miles an hour,
you do not mean that you actually walk exactly four miles in any
particular hour; you mean that if anybody did walk for an hour,
keeping all the time exactly at the rate at which you were walk-
ing, he would in that hour walk four miles. But now suppose that
you start walking four miles an hour, and gradually quicken your
pace, until you are walking six miles an hour. Then this question
may be asked: Suppose that anybody chose a particular number
between four and six, say four and five-eighths, is it perfectly cer-
tain that at some instant or other during that interval you were
walking at the rate of four miles and five-eighths in the hour? Or,
to put it more accurately, suppose that we have a vessel contain-
ing four pints of water exactly, and that somebody adds to it a
casual quantity of water less than two pints. Then is it perfectly
certain that between these two times, when you were walking at
four miles an hour, and when you were walking six miles an hour,
there was some particular instant at which you were walking ex-
actly as many miles and fractions of a mile an hour as there are
pints and fractions of a pint of water in the vessel? The hypothesis
of continuity says that the answer to this question is yes: and this
is the answer which everybody gives nowadays; which everybody
has given mostly since the invention of the differential calculus.
[Clifford 1870, 112]
This conclusion is a matter of “fact”, and not “calculation,” Clifford con-
tended. In other words, the hypothesis of continuity is a hypothesis about the
nature of matter and the nature of motion; it is a statement about the ontology
of the universe. In Clifford’s view, the dependence of calculus upon “continu-
ity” indicates that calculus describes motion in space as it exists. Calculus,
therefore, is not an abstract mathematical language disjointed from empir-
ical observation, as Dedekind and his supporters would have argued. The
techniques of calculus involve measurements of space over time. The mathe-
matical abstraction of these techniques into symbolic language does not sever
their meaning from those empirical and physical roots.
While it might seem obvious to the modern reader that calculus involves
an empirical measure of objects in motion, Clifford’s audiences would not nec-
essarily have considered mathematics, in general, to be a fundamentally em-
pirical field of knowledge. The vehemence with which Clifford emphasized the
empirical basis of continuity indicates the ideological nature of his statements.
In taking such a stand, Clifford was replying to members of the Analytic So-
ciety of the early 1820s, and their later followers at Cambridge, as well as
formalized approaches to continuity such as Dedekind’s, which sought to es-
tablish meanings for mathematical symbols that were internally defined (i.e.,
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not linked to external phenomena). For instance, in a subtle criticism of such
thinkers, Clifford invoked the physical image of “continuity” by describing two
rows of points that represent a series of positions in space. The lower row
of points represents a series of instants in time in which it is conceivable that
some thing might exist. At the instant of time represented by the first point in
the lower row, the object in question holds a position in space represented by
the first point in the upper row. That object only exists there for an instant,
and then it disappears, such that at the “succeeding instants where the lower
points have no points directly above them, the thing is nowhere at all” [Clifford
1870, 116]. At the instant of time when there is a space-dot above the object,
the thing exists in that space-position. A motion is discontinuous, therefore,
when the thing is in “different places at different times, though it is not at all
times that it exists at all.” In a discontinuous world, in other words, an object
appears and disappears between points in space. When it disappears, it has
no existence, which means that the object goes through a series of creations,
destructions, and re-creations as time moves forward. Mathematically, such
discontinuities arise when “the thing passes from one position to another dis-
tant from it without going through any intermediate position” [Clifford 1870,
116]. If the dots are very close together, they would appear to be continu-
ous to the general observer and “this is the sort of representation of what we
might have to suppose if we did not assume the truth of the law of continuity,”
Clifford stated [Clifford 1870, 117]. In that discontinuous world, however, the
path from one of the end-dots to the other would be composed of a series of
“discrete positions”.
In more technical terminology, Clifford described the mathematical “hy-
pothesis of continuity” as the claim that (see Figure 4),
The motion of N asserts that not merely N itself moves without
any jumps, but that the rate at whichN is going changes gradually
without any jumps, and consequently that the direction of P ’s
motion changes gradually; or that the curve described by P cannot
have a sharp point. [Clifford 1870, 119]
Thus, one can calculate the rate of change of the curve representing the
rate of change of another curve (i.e., a 2nd order derivative). Indeed, the
mathematical hypothesis of continuity asserts that this process can be repeated
until there is no longer a rate of change to measure. Ultimately, however, these
more advanced mathematical aspects of “continuity” are still based upon the
physical truth of continuous space:
The hypothesis of the perfect continuity ofN ’s motion asserts that
all these points move continuously without any jumps. [Whereas]
a jump made by any one of these points, being a finite change
made in no time, would be a change made at an infinite rate; the
next point, therefore, and all after it, would go right away from 0,
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and disappear altogether. We may express the law of continuity
also in this form; that there is no infinite change of any order.
[Clifford 1870, 121]
Ultimately, the hypothesis of continuity states that existent bodies never
lose their existence in space.
Thus, for Clifford, mathematical “continuity” is dependent upon what hap-
pens to an object in space as time progresses. If space were composed of
discrete units, then the movement of the object must involve leaps from one
segment of space to another with no travel in-between. It would involve what
Clifford would consider to be an instantaneous action-at-a-distance. And if
one were to try to measure a “rate of change” based on the size of a jump from
one dot to another, one would be led to the consideration that,
This rate might obviously change by jumps as violent and sudden
as those of the thing itself; at any instant, when the thing was
non-existent, its rate would be non-existent, and whenever the
thing came into existence its rate would suddenly have a value
depending on how far off its last position was. [Clifford 1870, 118]
In a discontinuous world there could be no such thing as a meaningful
“rate of motion.” There would be no meaningful use of the calculus, and
certainly no meaningful use of quaternions or vector transformations. As a
spatial model, discontinuity would mean that calculus could not accurately
represent the world as it is. The measurement of distances between points
or bodies in space would become a useless task, as it would tell us nothing
about the intervening segments of space. Mathematics as a descriptive science
would fall apart, as it would have no role to play in describing the causal
picture of the universe. Clifford thus acknowledged that science post-Newton
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and post-Leibniz could only move forward on the justifiable assumption that
continuity holds true in space and time. Otherwise, the entire structure of
calculus would have to be done away with and new tools for measuring motion
in discontinuous space would have to be developed.17
7. On Ether as the Necessary Result of the
Continuity Hypothesis
Perhaps not surprisingly, Clifford’s reliance upon the necessity of “continuity”
in space, and upon the physiological predisposition of human beings to believe
in it, was deeply intertwined with his belief in the existence of the ether-a
medium that guaranteed a material world in which cause and effect could
be explained via the interactions of particles. From Clifford’s perspective,
an all-pervading ether precluded the need for metaphysical explanations of
physical phenomena. Delivered to the Sunday Lecture Society in 1872 (a
popular forum), Clifford’s essay, entitled “Atoms”, expounded upon the link
between “continuity” and the ether and also the link between mystical beliefs
in “God” and action-at-a-distance “forces.”
Taking the example of a person rubbing a wet finger along the rim of a
glass, Clifford argued that in order to explain the phenomena of “sound” (i.e.,
the perception of musical waves) scientists had to acknowledge the existence
of a “surrounding” framework through which waves could travel such that a
person distant from the origin of the sound could perceive it. At its most
basic level, that surrounding framework (the ether) is composed of “atoms”,
which pervade the entire universe such that they are always in contact with one
another. According to Clifford, this understanding of the universe’s continuous
physical structure was no longer deniable:
The ‘atomic theory’ (. . . ) is no longer in the position of a theory,
but that such of the facts as I have just explained to you are really
things which are definitely known and which are no longer suppo-
sitions; that the arguments by which scientific men have been led
to adopt these views are such as, to anybody who fairly consid-
ers them, justify that person in believing that the statements are
true. [Clifford 1872, 163]
The “undulatory theory” of light was a scientific theory that Clifford also
considered to be consistent with his view of the universe, as it allowed for
the transference of “energy” between contiguous entities with no discontinuous
17. Clifford wrote often about the “fluxion” method that Newton had developed,
although it will be clear to any observer that Clifford—as with many mathemati-
cians of the late-19th century—interpreted the Newtonian fluxion and the Leibnizian
derivative as two sides of the same coin. Clifford’s goal was to link the assumption
of “continuity” to the scientific usefulness of the Newtonian fluxional method.
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jumps in space. In other words, light consists of waves transmitted through a
physically continuous medium. Clifford’s aim in drawing out this example was
to convince mathematicians that if they were to rely upon the fundamentally
physical notion of continuity, then they would be well advised to also recognize
the useful corollary outcomes of that choice. One such outcome was the fact
that, in order for light waves to travel from one location in the universe to
another, there had to exist a mechanical series of entities between the two po-
sitions such that light waves never disappeared and reappeared in the process
of transmission. From a Cliffordian perspective, therefore, if scientists and
mathematicians hoped to make meaningful claims about the universe, they
were compelled to adopt a thorough belief in the continuity of space and time.
In so doing, they had to resist conventionalising mathematical knowledge such
that “continuity” became a mere logical tool, or symbolical axiom, defined in-
trinsically and thus severed from the very empirical inferences that had given
rise to the notion in the first place.
Conclusion
Clifford’s final statement on continuity comes in the form of his monograph,
The Common Sense of the Exact Sciences (published posthumously in 1885
and edited by Karl Pearson). In his Common Sense text Clifford brought
together the various strands of his continuity theorizing, linking them to his
views on empiricism, physiology, non-Euclidean geometry, and bi-quaternions.
In a chapter entitled “Of Mass and Force”, he wrote that:
The custom of basing our ideas of motion on these terms “matter”
and “force” has too often led to obscurity, not only in mathemat-
ical, but in philosophical reasoning. We do not know why the
presence of one body tends to change the velocity of another; to
say that it arises from the force resident in the first body acting
upon the matter of the moving body is only to slur over our igno-
rance. All that we do know is that the presence of one body may
tend to change the velocity of another, and that, if it does, the
change can be ascertained from experiment.18 [Clifford 1885, 243]
For Clifford, the question of whether mathematical “continuity” ought to
be defined independently of physical continuity is a question about what con-
stitutes good scientific and mathematical theorizing. Given that empirical
sensory observation can only tell us so much about the world “in itself”, sci-
entists are heavily reliant upon their assumptions about how it ought to be.
18. Although Pearson was responsible for heavily editing this section of the book,
Clifford makes similar claims in various lectures delivered throughout the 1870s, many
of which were later published in his Lectures and Essays. Thus, the statement is a
fair representation of Clifford’s own views on the subject.
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For Clifford, therefore, it is sensible to assume continuity exists in the phys-
ical structure of the universe and to use this principle in order to define and
develop new geometrical models that account for what often appear to be
discontinuous events (i.e., gravity and other action-at-a-distance phenomena).
The Cliffordian case study demonstrates that “continuity” has served vari-
ous scientific, mathematical, philosophical and even physiological roles through-
out history. In Clifford’s case, it formed an intricate part of his philosophy
of science, and it underpinned his deeply materialist philosophy of space. In
comparing his account to that of Dedekind’s arithmetization of the concept,
it is possible to highlight the fact that in these divergent interpretations of a
fundamental concept in mathematics, a finitist picture emerges—one in which
the concept of “continuity” does not come pre-packaged with a series of un-
derstood and consensual meanings bound together. Rather, “continuity”, as
with all mathematical concepts, is underdetermined. Practitioners are free
to idiosyncratically draw upon the wide-spread cultural resources available to
them in adopting, redefining and using such concepts in previously unknown
ways. In this conceptually underdetermined world, it becomes clear that, for
someone like Dedekind, the motivation to define the concept of continuity
stemmed from a belief in the abstract and conventional (if not language-like)
nature of mathematics as distinct from any physical concerns. For Clifford, on
the other hand, the definition and use of continuity stemmed from his thor-
oughly physics-minded agenda, which ultimately placed limits on the bounds
of what could constitute good scientific theorizing (i.e., appeals to materialist
descriptions of cause and effect) and good mathematical practice (i.e., the de-
velopment of descriptive geometrical tools that would preserve continuity and
account for physical phenomena). Each practitioner viewed his own account
as the correct one; each practitioner thus managed to redefine the bounds of
proper use for this seemingly simple and intuitively clear notion.
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